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Because of the inherited ownership structure and the uncertain-
ties associated with reform, market regimes in reforming social-
ist economies will continue to need centralized controls over
wages in worker-controlled firms (the socialized sector). Unem-
ployment and an expanding private sector alone are unlikely to
provide a sufficient restraining mechanism for wages.
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Certain inherited features ol the socialist econo-  problemn  typically faced by reforming govem-
mies - socialized ownership, full employment,  ments of whether to enforce a hard budget
restricted job mobility, and de facto wage  constraint (and hence tolerate higher unemploy-
indexation - mean that drastic refonn of the  ment) or whether to resort to subsidies and
labor market must figure prominently in overall  associated departures from fiscal targets.
economic reform.
Given thc commitment to p.ivatization and
The qucstion is how to implement that range  the consequent uncertainty about future claims
of reformiis  to ensure compatibility.  One such  on capital, they also develop  -in  a two-period
tension relates to the fact that governments must  model  the conditions under which the worker-
demonstrate their commnitmeart  to a more passive  controlled firms will deplete capital stock,
role in the economy while rnaintaining direct  possibly through excessive wage growth.  They
controls over wages and possibly job decisions.  indicate how an appropriate tax rule - in this
case, a wage-per-worker rule  can restrain
Commander, Coricelli, and Staehr focus on  decapf alization.  They also discuss the possible
the implications for wage bargaining and policy  utility of contingent claims on capital--  such as
of inherited ownership arrangements and rules  vouchers - in offsetting capital depletion
about wage selting during the transition.  promoted by uncertainty about property rights.
In imposing unemployment on the system,  Finally, they emphasize the way wage tax
by repudiating tlhe  soft budget constraint, th1e  rules can affect employment and wages and how
refonning governmentt  tries to teach workers and  critical is their design.  A wage bill tax, as used
managers that behind it all lies a Phillips curve.  in Poland through 1990, not only reduces
But fiscal and political constraints limit the  employment but will probably raise wages.  By
govemmen t's tolerance (if not stimulatiop) of  contrast, a wage-per-worker tax will tend to raise
unemployment - so agents may be skeptical  er.ployment  and lower wages. These effects are
about government adherence to announced  ikely  to be reinforced in a two-sector context,
policy.  where worker-controlled firms and private firms
coexist and where relative wage considerations
Commander, Coricelli, and Staehr discuss  are important.
the strong tendency toward overemployment and
wage drift in socialist systems.  They focus on  The-  conclude thiat  because of the inherited
the market-based transitional economy, exempli-  ownership structure and the uncertainty associ-
fled by Poland since 1990, settinig  up a series of  ated with reform, market-based regimes will
models capturing the behavior of worker-  continue to need centralized controls over wages
controlled firms.  in worker-controllllled firms (the socialized
sector).  Unemployment and an expanding
They develop a simple policy game in whichi  private sector alone are unlikely to provide a
government policy is conditioned on output,  sufficient restraining mechanism for wages.
through a subsidy instrument.  This reflects the
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The scale  of the reform  agenda  in  the erstwhlle  uocLalist  economies  and
the  complemntary nature  of policy  changes  makes the  ordering  of reforms
pecullarly  complex.  Yet it is not  diffLiult  to understand  that certain  basic
features  of the inherited  system  the  presence  ex ante  of  socialized
ownership,  full  mployment, restricted  labor  mobillty  and  de facto  wage
indexation  nmcessarily  imply  that drastic  refoms  in the labor  market  area
must  feature  promLnently  and  at  an  early  stage  ln any  viable  reform  program.
To a ceortaln  extent,  thLs is  not a matter  of cholce.  The  questLon  turns  rather
on ensuring  the compatLbility  of LnterventLons  over particular  time horLzons.
Reforming  govrnments  characteristlcally  seek  to  establilh  a  c*mitment
to  prudent  macroeconomie  policies,  amongst  whLch  restrLetlve  fiscal  targets
figure  prominently.  AchLiving  these  targets  Ln  turn  will  reflect  their
ability  to  onforce  hard  budget  constraLnts  on  the  sociLiLzed  enterprLeas  and
thereby  simultaneously  tolerate  unemployment.  However,  to  the  extent  that  it
is  believed  that  structural  features  will  prmote myopic  or  short  iun  behavLor
on  the  part  of  workers  and  managers,  the  governmnt  is  facod  with  the  task  of
balancing  lts  desire  for  demonstrating  its  coemitment  to  a  more  passLve  role
in  the  economy  wlth  maLntenance  of  dLrect  controls  over  wages  and  possibly
employment  decision.
ThiL paper  concentrates  on the Lmpllcations  of those inherited  wage
setting  rules  and  ownership  arrangements  for  wage bargalnLng  and  policy  ln the
transltion. Several  tonslons  in  the system  are given  prominence. In  the
first  place,  wage and  employment  decisLons  have to be set  Ln a context  of a
departure  from  full  employment  and  where  any trade-off  between  wages and
employment  is  only partially  or perversely  pereived  by agents.  In  effect,  by
imposing  unemployment  on the system  through  repudLation  of the soft  budget
constraint,  the reformLng  government  attempts  to  teach  workers  and  managers
that  behind  it  all lLes  a Phllips  curve.  Yet  while  this Lmplies  LnLtLal
tolerance,  if not  stimul&tion,  of unemployment  on the  part  of the  government,
fiscal  and  polltical  constraLnto  will tend to place  bounds  on this tolerance,-3
possibly  leading  agents  to  believe  that  adherence  to announced  policy  will  be
weakened  and  loosening  of  stabilization  measucrs  pursued.
Secondl,  the  extent  of  worker  partLcip&tion  or  influence  in managment
decisions  reqires appropriate  analytical  treatment  whon  tracing  the  likely
outcomes f  bargaining  between  goverment end firms  and ln  wage  bargaining
within  the firm.  In so far  as the flrm  is  worker  managed,  this  tends  to  glve
rise  to  a  joint maximization  problem  over  wages and  employment. It  also  has
impartant  implications  for  the likely  wage and  employment  outcme  once
uncertainty  over ownership  rights  is introduced.
Thlrd,  the  goverment  faces  a  dilma  with  regard  to  its  wage  policy.
On  the  one  hand,  given  low  wage dispersion  and inadeqate  relative  returns  to
skills,  wage  controls  can  tend  to  dilute  incentives  for  firms  to  expand  while
also  conserving  a  sub-optimal  wage  structure. however,  if the structure  of
current  ownsrehip  iL  conducive  to capital  depletion  and  maximization  of labor
rents,  as  is conly  asserted  I#  a  contralized  wage  pollcy  would  be  critLcal
for restraining inflationary  preEsursE,  avoidLng a  lower capital stock and
ultimately  lower  aggregate  Employment,  ae  well  as  the  mergence  of  classical
unemployment  derived  from  excessive  real  wage  claim.  Xn this  light,  the
appropriate  queotion  concerns  the  docign  of the  wago  policy,  its  lncidence  and
degree  of prmanence.
Tho  paper  iL  organized  as  follows,  In  Section  2  we  provide  a  summary
discussion  of the  main features  of wage  Getting  in  types  of socialist
economies. These initial  conditions  are  shown  to  be  critical  in shaping  the
labor  market  policieo  of a  roforming  government  moving  to  a  market-based
system.  We draw  on  recent  Polish  experience  since  January  1990  highlighting
the  behavior  of Wagese and  employmont  during  the  initial  phase  of  the
stabilization  program.  In  Section  3  we  set  up  our  basic  model  of a  worker
controlled  fLrm  (WCF)  and  develop  a  one  period  policy  game between  the
government  and  the  WCF.  Section  4  discusess  the implications  of a  number  of
simple  tan  rules for  the  tlcF's  wage  and  omployment  docicions.  Section  5
Por  instance,  by  Hinds (1990);  Lipton  and  Sacho  (1990).-4-
explicitly  accounts  for  uncertainty  over  ownership  rights  and  models  this in  a
two  period  context. We indicate  sosi  possible  means  by which  decapitalization
of the firm  can  be avoided.
Section  2  Wage Detoseation  umader  socaiaLm
in  this section,  we lay  out  the range  of initial  condltions  from  which
more accelorcated  pisodes  of reforms  have  comeanced. We focus  on the  wage
setting fr  rmk  and outline in very stylied  form the manner ln  which wage
bargaining  arose  in  these systems. For  clarity  of exposltion,  a simple
distLnctlon  between  three  types  of  regims  --  the  centrally  planned  economy
(CPE)i  the  partially  reformed  socialist  economy  (PR)  and  a  market-based
economy  --  is  drawn.  2
2.1  Centrally  Planned  and  Partially  Reformed  RegLmes
In the  case of the CPE  and the  PRE certain  common  features  hold.  Full
employment  is  a  given.  Excess  aggregate  demand  for  labour  predominates
alongside  selective  labor  shortages.  Further,  there  is  no  evident  a3sociation
between  output  and  prico  with  no  endogenous  mechanism  of  equilibration  in  the
system.  Prices  are  largely  administered  and  explicitly  follow  a  cost-plus
routine.  The  full  employment  regimes  tend  also  to  be  associated  with low
mobilLty  exacerbated  by infrastructural  constraints,  particularly  housing. 3
In  both  oystems,  wage  levels  tended  to  be low  with minimal  dispersion,  thereby
distorting  the intortemporal  accumulation  of skills. Labour  allocation  and
sorting  largely  occurs  independently  of prices.
It  would oee  reasonable  to  assume  that in the controlled  economy  wages
could  be considered  exogenous.  This is incorrect. 4 In the CPE  world  of
vertical  controls  and  exhaustion  of labor  reserves,  the planner  generally  had
2 For  example,  Bulgaria  could  be classified  as  a CPU until 19901  Hungary
and Poland up to 1989 could be classofied as partially reformed regimes and
Poland,  the forer  CDR and possibly  Hungary  since  1990  as market-based
regimes.
3 Mayo and Stein (1988)  indicate  jiouoing  and labor  market  linkages  in  the
case of Poland.
4  A  fuller  discuooion  is contained  in  Commander  and Staehr  (1990).-5-o
recourse  to  piece  rates  to  motivate  workers  and  to  circumvent  the  monitoring
problem.  Managers  of  enterprises  were  effectively  transmission  bolts  and
lacked  autonomy  in  negotiating  wages.  The  wage-bile  of  enterprises,
comprising  base  wages  plus  piece  rate adjustments,  was the  control  variable
employed  by  the  planner.  S
In the  more  decentralized  world  of  the PRE  vertical  controls  were
relaxed  and  greater  autonomy  to  enterprlse.  and  manager.  was  granted.  In
Hungary  and  Poland  this  was  also  associated  with  the  transformation  of  the
majorLty  of  enterprises  Lnto  management  by  workers'  councils.  Wages  were
gonerallr  explieLtly  associated  with  productLvLty  or  profitability  indLcators.
Decentralization  opened  up  a number  of tensions  with  regard  to  wage
policy.  EnterprLses  faced  dLstorted  prices  complicating  simple  association  of
warranted  wage  growth  to  profitability  or  productivity  Lndicator..  Soft
budget  coastraLnts  and  the  redLstributLor 8 of profits  through  the  budget
generated  perverse  LncentLves  for  enterprlses  and  generally  subverted  the
assocLatLon  between  the  wage distrlbutLon  and  plant  or  industry-level
performance.  6  The  absence  of  a  hard  budget  constraLnt  and  the  explicit  use
of  cost-plus  pricing  reqpired  that  th  governmenit  continued  to  regulate  wages
through  centrally  given  norm  to  avoid  wage drift  and  cost-side  inflationary
pressures.  Average  wages  in  the  dominant  socialized  sector  remained
characterized  by  low  dispersLon.  7  In  both  CPE and  PRE regimes  social  cash
and  kind  transfers  and  subsidies  further  tended  to  equalize  gross  household
income  and  not  personal  income  In Hungary,  for  example,  where  social  Lncome
expanded  to  around  49% of  total  household  income  for  the  period  1980-1990,  the
5 Adam  (1979)  contains  a  detailed  discussion.
6  KartesL  and  Cukor  (1987)  show  that in  Hungary  short  run  tensions  in
goods markets  and  with  respect  to  enterprise  performance  have  guLded  wage
policy.
?  Note,  however,  that  the  gap betwon  private  and  pubiLe  sector  wages
tended  to  expand.  See,  for  example,  Falu-SzLikra  (1986).-6-
Gini cooffLcient  for  gross  houaehold  income  at the  end  of  the  period  fell  from
0.29  for  main  wage earnings  to  0.23  when  including  social  inco  and  taxes. 
The  mergence  of  more  cor.plex  bargaining  behavior  in  the  PRB  turned
around  the interactlon  kitween  managers,  workers  and  government.  Enterprise
managers,  were  motivated  through  bonus  payments  associating  their  wages  with
performance  or  synthetic  lndLcators.  By lmpooirg  an approprLate  Lneentive
structure  the  goveranmnt  hoped  t2  engage  workers  and  managers  in  a  cooperative
bargain  over  wages  and  effort.  For  the  most  part,  thio  structure  was  given
through  tax  policy  conditioned  on  tho  wage,  elther  on  the  level  or,  at  timos,
on  the  rate  of  growth. 9 Wages  paLd  out  above  an  announced  norm  were  taxed  by
the  government.  Most  comonly  a  tax  (t)  was levied  on that  share  of the  wage
bill above  the warranted  amount (wP),  This  Lmplied  in  terms  of  cost  per
employee;
w+t(w  -wP)  ,  for  w3wP
This tax fcrmula wo%Ald  have only been fiscally neutral Lf a  rebate or subsidy
per employee  had  been offered.1 0 A rebate  or subsLdy  was obvLously  not
applied  ln the full  employment  regime  as  an explicLt  objectLve  of tax  based
wage policy was to motivate labour sheding  by enterprLsoe.
Experience  with  applying  an  exogenous  incentlve  structure  and  regulating
wage  development  by  tax  based  wage  policies  was  very  mixed  and  generally
dLappoLnting.  In  general,  It  would  be appropriate  to see  workers  and
managers  playing  cooperatLvely  against  the  goveranment.  Non-cooperative
settings  invariably  prevaLled  when,  as In Poland,  there  was  no underlying
agreement  over the dLitrLbution  of rescurces  Ln the economy. While  the broad
0 The  dLfference  for  personal  not Lncome  wLth and  wlthout  social  income
was  0.18  and  0.23.  See  World  Bank  (1991).
9 A  bewllderLng  range  of wage  tax formulas  have been applied;  for further
details,  see  Adam (1979)1  IMF  (1989a  and  1989b;.
'°  A  rebate,  such  as  rw-t(w-w"),  would  have  net  the  cost  per worker  at;
w+t(w-w 0)-rw,  thereby  being  neutral  wLth  regard  to  employment.-7-
rule  appears  to  have  been an  indexation  of  wages  to  price.,  the ability  to
enforce  wage norms  through  tax  pollcy  varied  widely."
2.2  The Market-Based Regies  Polmad 1990/91
Central  to the  regime  change  lo  the  tolerance  of  unemployment  and  the
gradual  emergence  of  a Phillips  cuxrve.  AddLtionally,  labor  allocation  ia
meant  to  be largely  market  driven  withLn  the constraints  Lmposed by
limLtations  on  mobilLty  and  plant-opecific  non-wage  benefLts.  Partial  wage
lberalization is likely  to occur.  In  thl  sectiLon,  w8 concentrate  on  the
recent  Pollsh  stabliLzatLon  experience  focusing oan  the  way  ln  whLch wages  are
determined  once  unemployment  is  tolerated  and  the  government  signals  a
repudiation  of  the  soft  budget  constraLnt  and  accommodatlng  monetary  policy.
The  broad  features  of the  PolLih  etablILxatLon  program  are  covered
elsewhere  132 In thLs  context,  it suffices  to  underlies  the  use of  wages,
together  with  the exchange  rate,  ao  nominal  anchor  to  the  otabilizatLon  in  the
context  of  a  radical  trade  opOnLng  and  the assocLated,  if incomplete,
importatLon  of a  new  relative  prlce  structure,
Wages  were  controlled  at  the  outeet  of  the  program  to arrest  the
develoyent  of a  prlce-wages  plral.  In the flrst  four  monthe  wages  could  be
adjusted  Ln relation  to  inflation  by  a  coeffLciont  oLgnifLcantly  lower  than
one,  except  for  July.  11  Centralized  control  on  wages  was carrLed  over  and
justified  mainly  ln  terms  of dampenLng  inflation  gLven  the ownership
structure,  uncertaLnty  over  the  scale  of restructuring  and  the  cost-plus
pricLng  routine  followed  by  produearo.
The  outcome  of  the  program  ln  its fLrat  year can  be  summarized.
11 For  Hungary  and  Poland,  ace  Conddar  and  CoriceIlL  (1991).
12 Lipton  and  Sacho  (1990);  CorE1olli  and  Rocha  (1990)
13  The  inLtlally  weak LndexatLon  cooffLciont  and  the  low  exchange  rate
delLvered  a  vory  low  wage  level  with  an average  daily  wago  of  under  US$4.e  Real wages  foll  by  31%  over  the  full  year  14;
o  Output  in  the oocializod  octor  fell  by  25%t
o  Employment  fell  much  lese  than  output  and  therefore  productivity
dropped  by  about  20  praccnt;
O  UnAmployment  rose from  almost  &erS  to  over  6% of  the  labor  force
on  a  risLng  trend.
o  inflation  was 250% ovor  the yoar,  with  a  monthly  rate  of  6%
by  early 1991.
o  Slzeable  budget  and trade  surpluses  were  generated.
The  first  year  has  been characterized  by  stagnation  of output  and
persistent  lnflation.  Real  wages  proved  to  be highly  flexible  downward  in
response  to  the  initial  shock  to  the economy,  while  employment  dropped  only
marginally  Ln the first  two  montho  of  1990  deopLte  a  steep  decline  in  output.
After  March  real  wages  began  to  increase  while  employment  contlnued  to
decline. As a  reoult,  ln  the second  half  of  1990  one  can  observe  a  rapid
increase  in  real  wageo  together  with  a  rapid  increase  in unemployment.
Overall,  the  behavior  of  wagos,  employment  and  productivity  during  1990
seem  to  have  reflected  more  a  generalized  recession  than  a  shake-out  of  the
economy  associated  with  structural  reforms.  Indeed,  output  dropped  in  every
sector  of  the  economy.
2 o  3  1y8eml8Xyl08t
The  rise in  unemployment,  though  subsetantial  and  significantly  more
rapid  than  in  other  reforming  economiee  13, wao  not  associated  with  a  single
bankruptcy  in  1990,  even  though  mase layoffs  increased  in  the latter  part  of
the  year and  accounted  for  roughly  a third  of  cumulative  unemployment  over  the
'4  Measuremnt  L  complicated  when  comparing  with  the ohortage  regime  of
1989  and  the fall  in the inflation  tax  on  households  over  this  period.  It  is
also  not clear  what  has  happened  to  non-wage  components  of income;
traditionally  a  large  share  of  household  income.
IS  In  Hungary  unemployment  moved from  under  0.4%  in  January  1990  to  around
2% of the labor  force  in  January  1991  and  io projoected  to  reach  between  3.5-
4.5%  by  tho  end  of  1991.-~~~~  la
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year.  I  St  li  important  to  note  that  the  fall  ln  output  Ln the  socLalized
secttr  (25  percent)  *xceeded  the  drop  ln  eployment.  (14  percent),  implying  not
only  a  fall  in  productLvLty  but  likely  contLnuLng oveguanning.
Sectoral  data  consLstently  show  output  falling  more  than  employment  (see
Tablo  2.1). Moreover,  the  variability  of  output  across  osetors  (measured  by
the  coeffLcient  of  variation  ln  Table  2.1)  was  twLce  as  large  as  that  of
employment 0 Overall,  the  domlnant  strategy  appears to  have  been  to  reduce
output  rather  than  mployment.  1'  Flows  into  unemloyment  have  consequently
to  be  further  related  to  new entrants,  ao  poseLble  laor  supply  effects  and
the  Lnduement  to  reglster  as unemployed  created  by  a  fairly  generous
replacment  Eatio.  10
2.4  wages  and Wage  Policy
The  sharp  and  programud  fall  in  economy-wide rcal  wages  disguL  se a
rather  more complex  set  of  developmnts.  First,  after  March  1990  real
consumer cnd  producer  wages  rose  signifLeantly,  falLng  again  only  in  December
(vliguro  1).  By November real  wageo  were  barely  20% below the  average for  1989
and  above  the  level  in  January  1989  not  takLng  Lnto  account  dLfferences  in
offective  purchasing  power over  these  period.  due  to  the  elLmLnation  of
shortages.  Second,  wages  and  profits  movd  Lnversely  following  March (Figure
1)o  SeCtoral  data  (Table  2.1)  do howver  show profLts  and wages  movLng
together  but  thLi  can  largely  be  aserLbod to  priLe  changes rather  than
productivity  growth.  Product  wages  exhLbLt  far  greater  variance  than
1a Note  that  for  most branches  profLt  margins  increasod  ln  1990  as  output
declined.  The stronger  than  expected  profit  performance of  the  soclalized
sector  can  generally  account  for  the  absence  of  bankrupteces.  See  Coricelli,
de  la  Calls,  Pinto  (1990).
:7 Layoffs  have  been  concentrated  ln  a  number  of  sub-sectors;  principally,
retail  trade,  construction,  transportation,  engineerlng  and  coal.
10  The benefits  schem Li  of  LndfiLnLto  duration  wLth  a  70%  replacemnt
ratio  at  the start  falling  to 40% after  nlne months.  There  iL  however  no
indexation  above  a  30n  floor.  In  Hungary  the  gross  replacemnt  ratio
i1milarly  ranges  from  70%  unindexed  at  the  outset  to  40%  by the  and  of  the
eocond  year. ClaLms  can  only  be  made  for  up  to  two  years.Table  2.1
Potand:  SQctoral  date,  January-Deceirrer  1990  1/
Jan-Dec.  1989u100
.................................................................................................................................
Produceor  Real  Product  Consuinr  Nominal
Eaoltoy2nt  Productivity  Productfon  Pricoo  Profits  "  wage  tdages
................  ........................................................................................................................
COAL  91.80  78.00  71.60  1,078.3  42.1  46.8  63.4  441.3
FUEL  99.70  78.74  78.50  1,190.8  168.1  52.0  75.8  527.9
P09ER  101.80  88.41  90.00  1,272.1  313.8  44.9  68.7  478.1
FERROUS  KETALLURGY  94.40  88.03  83.10  1,098.1  117.9  55.2  74.7  519.6
NMO-FERROUS  METALLURGY  97.20  78.50  76.30  1,090.6  113.7  51.3  72.9  507.6
METAL PRODUCTS  90.60  79.25  71.80  836.5  75.6  64.3  67.5  470.0
ENGINEERING  89.20  90.36  80.60  781.8  74.2  69.4  68.5  476.7
PRECISION  INSTRUMENTS  89.70  92.75  83.20  650.1  60.8  80.9  65.7  457.1
TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  91.50  80.77  73.90  885.0  70.4  63.8  68.7  477.9
EL-TECH  ENS. & ELECTRONICS  92.00  85.54  78.70  734.6  57.4  70.9  65.5  456.0
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY  93.90  80.19  75.30  938.9  80.6  59.1  68.2  474.7
BUILDING MATERIALS  93.20  82.40  76.80  892.1  91.9  60.6  67.6  470.8
GLASS & GLASS PRODUCTS  94.60  76.53  72.40  873.0  58.3  62.5  67.0  466.2
POTTERY  & CHINA  97.00  76.39  74.10  734.1  51.7  72.4  66.8  465.0
WOWD  & WOOM  PRODUCTS  89.80  84.19  75.60  730.7  35.4  73.9  66.0  459.6
PAPER  & PAPER  PRCPt(CTS  92.30  83.75  77.30  949.8  70.5  58.8  67.7  471.1
TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  88.90  66.93  59.50  638.1  21.3  78.0  61.8  429.8
WEARING  APPAREL  89.20  77.80  69.40  496.8  27.4  97.7  62.1  431.9
LEATHER  PRODUCTS  90.10  73.58  66.30  565.3  17.6  84.6  60.3  419.8
FOOD  INDUSTRY  98.20  75.66  74.30  727.6  52.0  82.2  66.0  459.2
,,,,,,,,,...............................  ,,......................................................  ......  ...........  .............
Umweighted  averages  93.26  80.89  ?S.4  8S8.2  80.0  66.5  67.2  463.0
Std.  deviation  3.70  6.03  6.33  204.62  63.98  13.46  3.85  26.82
Cooff.  of  variation,  in  %  3.96  7.45  8.39  23.84  79.9S  20.21  5.73  5.73
1/  Oue to  uwavaflabitity  of  data  On produrer  pricoo  by  actcore  for  Oecczbar  1990,
the  product  wage  referS  to  JanUary-Noves5ar.10
cOnsumption  wages.  Real  wagee  aloo  eahlblt  greateg  variance  acroos  oectors
than  employmnt.
Throughout  1990  wagoo  wero  contrally  reulated,  nxcept  for  private
sector  wages.  The  meachanim  of  onforcemnt  was a  tan  on  wage  j)1jl  increases
in oxcoso  'j  lavelo  given  by  the  eonthly  coefficient  or  no=  in).  The  norm  was
inflation  in a given  m3onth tiomo  a  co0fficlont  usually  less  than  one.  I'  The
wage  bill  tan  tooh  tho  following  fors
gt(wn-ow,.,%zj1+nz)  )
with a  very  steep  progreosivity  in  tax  rates.
Designed  in  thio  way tho  tan  wao not  neutral  vie-a-VlB  employment  nor
vie-a-via  the  cowposition  of  tho  labor  force  within  an  enterprise.  The
monthly  indexation  rule  also  imparted  inertia  to  the  inflationary  process.  A
particular  feature  of  the s6chm wae  the ability  of enterprise,  to  carry  over
wages from  month  to  month  whon  actual  wago  payments  fell  below  the  norm.
Actual  wages fgll  below  the norm in tho  fgirt  sin  months  of  the  program.
Thereaftor  the  accumulatod  ourplus  was  drawn  down  with  wage. consistently
exceeding  the  nom.  Only  in  November  and  Dcember  wore  accumulated  wage  normo
excoeded,  reoulting  in substantlal  tax  ponalties  being  incurred  by
enterprioes. In thi  roegard,  wagoo  barely  anchored  the  stabilization  at  all,
savo  at  the  end  of the  yoar.
The factoro  behind  stronger  wage growth  In  the second  half  of  1990  are
difficult  to  pin  down.  The rolativo  buoyancy  of  profit  margins  and  some
relax&tion  of  crodit  policy  in  the  third  quarter  of  1990 ouggest  some  ability
to  pay  on  the  p8rt  of  ontorpriseo.  "  At  tho  same tim,  it  would  be logical
to  assume  that  workero  would  toot  the govorment'o  resolve  to  hold  down  wages,
particularly  given  the rolatively  gradual  inerease  in unemployment.  The fact
that  fimEs were willing to pay  taxes on  excess  wage increases,  at  rates above
19 The  coefficiont  waO  0.3  in January,  0.2  between  February  and  April,  0.6
in  May and  Juno,  1  in July  and  0.6  thoeoafter.
2  However, pooitivo intoroot  rates would  have  acted  to  limlt credit
financed  wage  incroasoe.  A  oimple  chain  of causality  between  money  and  wages
is not  obviouse- 11  -
100  percent,  supports  this  argument.  In  principle,  the  tax  on  the  wage  bill
might  explain  the  phenomenon  of  raising  real  wages  and  declining  employment
during  the second  half  of  1990.
Par 1991  the  wage  tax has  been modifLed. Plst,  to eliminate  the  pro-
unemployment  blas and constraints  an  expanding  fims,  the  average  wags rather
than  the  wage  bill  is subject  to  regulation. Second,  a monthly  indexation
scheme  ham  been retained.  a'  Third,  wage expsion  has  been explcitly
associated  with  the  enterprise  profit  ratio.  Fourth,  private  firms  can  set
wages free  of  governmnt rogulation,  while  firms  that are  about  to  be
privatized  --  'comercialized  entities'  --  are  partially  exempted  from  excess
wage  taxation.  22
By linking  permissible  wage  growth  to  a  firm's  profit  ratio  (nominal
profits  plus  wages over  wages) the new polley has the  clear disadvantage  of
allowing  wage  growth  to  depend  on  the price  that  the  enterprise  can  charge.A
Thls  can  be  an lnvitatlon  to  exploLt  market  powor,  particularly  lf  it  is
believed  that  workers  will  attempt  to  maximize  short  term  wage  growth.  24
Additlonally,  a  monthly  lndexation  arrangement  retais  inertia  and  ensures
that  the  system rmaino  very sensitLve  to prcLe  shocks.  This  is particularly
problematic  in the  Polish  context  still  subject  to large  temporary  shocks  to
inflation  --ouch  as  the increase  in administrative  prices  in  January  1991.  An
alternative  approach  would  be  to lengthen  the  indexation  period  but  this  would
obviously  depend  an  the  goverment's  ability  to  enforce  a longer  constant  wage
ceiling.
In  comon  with  heterodox  stabilization  experLences  eleowhere  wage
restraint  in Poland  was fairly  effective  at  the  outset  of the  program.  25  The
21 A  0.6 indexation  coefficient  for  January  1991.
22 There  is  an  obvious  adverse  selection  problem  here.
2  The  tax formula  being:  t((tf,+w,/w,)  /  (w,I/wba))
24  in theory,  monopolies  are excluded  but  whether  this  will  bo  enforceable
is another  matter.
2  For  experience  elsewhere,  see  Riguel  and  Liviatan  (1989).12  -
problems  start  when  controls  are  weakened  or  made  more  flexiblo.  These
problems  are  more  acute  for  formr socLalLt  economies  preisely  because  of
tho  ownership  structure  and  worker  partlcLpation  in  decision  making. This
structure  has  further  implications  for  whether  contralized  wage  control
policies  can  be  seen  as  short  term  devLces  to  restrain  cost-push  inflationary
pressures or are lkely  to r*spond over a more protracted period to  the
institutional  particularities  of  such  regimes.  N
Section  3  Wage and  mployment  Decisions  An the  Worker  Controlled  Viz.
We start  from  the  stylized  lnstitutional  features  of  a  market-based
regime.  There  is  a  dominant  socLalized  sector  in  which  workers'  councils
control  the  firm  and  whose  lnterforence  in  nmagement  is  non-trivial.
Henceforth,  we  refer  to  such  firms  as  worker  controlled  (WCF).
3.1 The  W@rker-Contralled  FLr
The  implications  of  active  participatLon  of  workers  in  management  have
been  extensively  explored  elsewhere,  particularly  ln  the  Yugoslav  context  27.
Labour  managed  firms  have  been  wldely  characterized  as  maximizing  lncome  per
worker  rather  than  profits,  so  that  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of
labour  doeg  not  euate  the  wage  rate  but  rather  lneme  per  worker  29.  If  this
was  the  case,  it  could  readily  be  shown  that  mployment  would  be  lower,  that
there  would  be  a  tendency  to  substitute  capital  for  labour  and  that  there
would  be an  inverse relationship  between  price and output  changes.  However,
the robuotness  of these results has been questioned.  For  instance,
distinguishing  over short and  long  run  membership can  generate  a  positive
short  run  output  supply  curve ".  Further,  in  a  static  setting  optimal
employment,  given by  the  employment  equating  the  marginal  revenue  product  of
E  Layard  (1991)  discusses  these  points  in  rather  more  detaLl.
"  See,  Lnter  alia,  Brewer  and  Browning  (1982)1  Vanek  (1970);  Ward (1958)
2a  gm  (pY-(XpAi+f))/L  rather  than  max w- VY-(wL+EpAi+f)  where  ruincome
per  worker,  Ye output  Le inputel  f-  flxed  costs;  Lu  number of  workers.
"  M4iyazaki and  Neary  (1983)  show this  to  hold  except  over  a  range  of  very
low  prices  where  the  fixed  cost  burden  implied  by  membership  size  is  too
Severe.- 13 
labour with the lowoot-paid worker  mr,  can b  ohwn  to  doviato relatively
mildly  from  employmont  in  a  convontioncil  profit  maimisinqr  firm  1.  Empirieal
work hao also empha1sied the importanc  of  0z9aogsnouoly givon ruleos  and
polibc libes.
our objectives arm more restrictive.  We assume  - at leact initially --
that  the WCF operates in a  market environmnt.  Thogo Li, however, uncertainty
as to  consistency in governmsnt behaviour,  particularly wlth regard to
enforcing  a  haed  budget  constraint  oanf  girms. Mrorovor,  there  Ls  uncertainty
ovOr  ownership  and the deggeo  to  whleh WtoCl  will be  aeriod over lnto future
poriods.  These lssuae are explored further in Sectlono 3.2. and 3.3.  For our
purposes, worker control can be handled as equivalent to a powerful trade
unlon prosenco whore wagos and amploymont are subjoct to  joLnt  maxmisiatLon.'
In contrast with the claooical labour managod flrmv the  RCF  also cares about
employment and accordlngly maximizoo tho eopoetod utlilty of the
ropreaontativa workeo in  tho fiirm. Ioouming further that there is a random
selectlon of workers smong  thooo that aro lald off and that thoy oubosquently
receive unemployment benfiLt, this allowo uo to vlow tho IYCF  as a  limit caseo
for an offlclent bargain modol of tho typo coamonly implomonted for capitalist
firms.  Howavor, ln the tiCF  workero will bo c0notralnod by the firm's profit
level and not dlrectly by the labour demand curvo and the wage  will hence
equate tho average product of labour,  Tho point on  tho contract curvo that is
picked will  not result from bargalning, as in a conventional  firm.
We assume that the workers maximizo the eapected utillty of a
representative worker ovor prospects of omploymont at the contract wage as
against unemployment with a fall-back lncome,  Tho lattor is given by
"  Spinnowyn  and  Svejnar  (1990), who also emphasizo the importance of
exioting memberehip slze in dtoerminlng employmont and the output response to
a price increase.
'  Prasnikar and  Svejnar (1990).
n Thli  contraoto wlth widoly uGod rlght-to-manago or monopoly union
modelB where the wage lo elthor bargained or pickod  by  tho union and
employment oubBequently oet unilatorally by tho employlro tho outcoeo lylng on
the labour demand curve.  Soo  Oowald (1985) for a  oumeary of thlo litorature.Figure  3.1
w
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unemployment  bnBofLtV  (8).  All  current  workers  or  mbrsu  (N)  receive  equal
treatmQnt  and  those  who  will  bo) oventually  unemployed  are  randomuly  selected
among  membero.  The  workers  or  union's  utillty  function  it;
U,  - L/f  u(w)  *  (N-L)/N  u(B)  for  L.sa  (3.1)
The production  function  P(L)  iL  assumed  to  have  positive  but  decreasing
returns  I
V'(L)"O,  F'(L)40  and  V(O)cO
In  the  WCFQ the  union  maxiemises  its  utility  (eq.3.2)  wLth  respect  to  wages  and
employment  subject  to  a  &ero  profit  conetraint  3 1
tl(L)  - wL  - 0  (3.2)
where  a  is a  prlce  or  productlvlty  shock  if the price  iL  normalized  to  1.  We
set  4 constant  and  equal  to  1.
From  the flrst  order  conditlona  we  obtains
(U(w)-LU(B))/U'(w)  - w-F'(L)  (3.3)
ands
umay(L)  /L  (3.4)
Eq.  (3.3)  lo  that  for  the  contract  curvo,  whlec  eq.  (3.4)  gives  the  'rent
oharLng'  rul(D  whleh,  ln  the  caso  of  the  WCY involves  the  workers  approprlatlng
all  revenues.
Figure  3.1  io  a  standard  diagram  in  wage-employment  space  contrasting
the  non-Pareto  optimal  outcome  on  the  labour  demand  curve  and  efficient
bargains  given  by  the  tangency  of  tho  firm's  lsoprof  lt  curves  and  the  workers
or  union's  lndifference  curvsoo.  The  locus  of  the  polnts  of  tangency  defines
the  contract  curve,  The  looprof1t  curves  have  a  poiLtlve  slop,  until  the
wage  equates  the  marginal  revenue  product  of  employment,  (E"L).  The  lowest
point  on  the  labour  demand  curve,  0, is  the  competltlve  euillbrlum.  Thle  can
be thought  of  as that  point  where  the  workers'  have  no  bargaining  power  and
where  B  is the  supply  prlce  of  labour  or the reservation  wage.  The contract
curve  emanates  from  thiB  polnt  end slopes  upward  therafter,  given  w'w  (the
sj The firm  would  fold  below  thLs levoll  ln  other  words,  the hard  budget
constraint  binds,W  15  W
competitive  wage) I wasF'(L).  Any  point  along  the contract  curve  above  D
implies  a wage above  the  magglnal  revenue  product  ca  labour. Thls  illustrates
the nature  of the molution  to  Oeff1eient  bargmlnin9.' The solutlon  io
efficient  for  the firm  and  the given  met  of m  ug it  li  however  lnegffLcent
from  a sociol  point  of  view  as  there is  oeessive  employment. The  model  seam
to accord  well  with the 'stylLzd'  fact  of  ove  ing  and labor  hoarding  in
soclalist  econamies. The outer  polnt  3 on the  contract  curve  is that  given  by
the tangency  of  the zero Lsoprof  it curve  and  the workers'  lndliferonce
curve.  It  can be  seen  as  that  polnt  at  which  the  workers' approprLate  the
maximum rent  above  the  reservatlon  wage  subject  to  the  slope  of  the  zero
isoprofit  curve  and  thus  the  zero  proflt  conditlon.
In  the  literature  on  market  economies,  the  precise  point  On  the  contract
curve  is  generally  undetermined.  Most authors  have  opted  for  a  Nash-Zkuthen-
Harsanyi  solutLon  to  the  bargaining  problem.  Thls  maxLmizes  the  product  of
the  gains  from  a  contract  subject  to  the  respective  bargaining  powers  and
threat  polnts  of  the  parties  to  the contreet.'4  The  threat  polnts  and  union
size  are  given  exogenously. Further  aosumptions  are, that  the  threat  polnt
for  profit arners is  eWual  to  zero,  that  profit  earners  are risk  neutral  and
their  utility  linear  in  profits  and  that  there  is a representative  worker.  35
In  this  setting,  wlth  s-l,  the  maximLzatlon  over w  and  L, under  the  constraint
that  L  is maller  than  total  mbership,  iL  as  followel
L[U(w)-U(B)  1  (F(L)-wLJ  (3.5)
From  the first  order condltlons  we  obtains
(U(w)-u(B))/U'(w)  - w-F'(L)  (3.6)
W a  (F(L)/L +  F'(L))/2  (3.7)
Eq.  (3.6)  gives  the  contract  curve,  while  (3.7)  lndicates  the  speeLfic  point
on  the  contract  curve  resultlng  from  the  solution  to  the  Nash bargain.  The
latter  takes  the  form  of  a  sharing  rule  and  means  that  under  a  cooperative
"  Thli  can  be wrLtten  ass  Has (  (fi f  U°  [I.  -U.1"O'  )
'  Aoki  (1986)  has  an  lntereotlng  fiscuasion  of  themo  Easumptiono.- 16
melutLon  the  wage would  equal  the  mean  of the  gLnal  and  average  products  of
labour.6  a  more general formulation of the sharing  ules,  without  asoumLng
either  a  zero  threat  polnt for  proflt  earnege  or risk neutrality,  would  be "I
w 0  1/(14-)C(F(L)+6  PMIM)/L  (3.8)
with 6  measuring  the  telative  bargainlng  poer  of  the union.
Ralilng  the  workers'  bargaining  r or throat  point  would  obvlously  imply
that  average  productlvlty  will  matter  more than  mrginal  productivlty  ln  the
determination  of  the  wage.  In  the caos  of  the  WCP, golng  to  the zero  proflt
point  on the contract  curve  wLil be eqivalent to setting  wages  and  employment
on the average  revenue product  of  labour  curve. A
Figure  3.2 illustgates  the  wage-employment  outome  aesociated  with
eq. (3.8)." Wages ln  the WCF  w1il be  on the  average  product  of  labour  curve
at a  polnt  such  as 0. The classical  labour  mnaged  firm,  whlih  does  not care
about  employment, will  set wage. at  Z, that  point givlng the  mazLmum  feasible
wage  peg  worker.  A  comptLeLve  fLrm will  mat wages  eqal  to  the reservation
wage,  B.  Employment  will  be  on the  labour  de  d  curve,  F'(L),  for  the  labour
managed  firm  and the  c  gptitLve  fiLm,  but  thLs  will  not  be  so  for  the  WCI.
For  the latter,  wages  will  ha above  those  for  the compaetitLve  firm,  but lower
than  for  the clasalcal  labour  managed  flrm.  The highest  employment  level  li
associated  wLth  the  MCF.
We can  now trace  through  the  likely  implieatLons  for  the  wage  and
employment  of  varlous  shocks. Two  types  of shocks  have  been etudLed  in  the
36  The  sharing  rule  Ls  generated  by  the  cooperative  settLng  and  by  the
assumptLon  of  riLsk  neutrality.  Note  also  that  the  average  revenue  product
curve  is  downward  sloping  so that  the  bargalned  outcome  is at  the LntereactLon
of  the  upward  sloplng  fficLoeney  locus  and  a  downward  sloping  locus  reflectLng
bargainLng  strength  (McDonald  and  Solow,  1981)
n  FollowLng  AokL  (1986).
"  Precisely  because  of the  institutional  arrangement,  one can  also  note
that  the  problem  of  the  flrm  reneging  en  poet  on  the employment  associated
wLth  this  outcom  and  moving  back  to  the  marginal  revenue  product  curve  is  not
an  issue.
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context  of  the)  prooont  modal.  '°  One  involves  a  shock  to  the  labour  market,
ouch  ao  an  lncroeae  in  unemployment  benefits,  the  other  a  change  in  goods
markets,  such  as  an  advorso  demand  ahock.  A productivity  ohock  will  be
equlvalent  to  the  dewand  shock.  An  inorasoo  in  unemployment  beneflts  will
chift  the contract  curvo  up  to  tho  left.  This  clearly  implies  that  at any
lovol  of employment  wages  an  the  new contract  curve  will  be  higher.  An
adverae  product  market  shock  would  aloo  lndue6  a  shift  to  the left  (north-
west)  of the  contract  curvo,  lmplying  a  lower  level  of  employment  at  any  given
wags.  Wlth  riok  neutral  workero  (i.e.  a  linear  utillty  function)  real  wages
are  independent  from  product  market  shocks. Wa1ge  would  thus  be  rigid  ln  the
face  of  changed  product  market  condltiono.  If  labour  and  goods  market  shocks
occur  cimultaneously  --  as  is  the  case  in Pollsh-type  stabilization  programmes
--  employment  will  decline,  while  the  effect  on  wages  will  be unclear.
introducing  considerationo  of membership  oize  obvlously  modifies  the  result
and  would  gonogally  make  wagso  flenible.  Xn partlcular,  lf  current  members
discount  the  future,  tho prospect  of  unemployment  next  perlod  motivates  a  real
wage  fall.
Having  oat  out  the  basic  model,  we  now  provldo  a series  of extensions
that  explicitly  assoclato  tho  rooponos  of the WCP  to  government  pollcy  and
pollcy  lnotrumonts,  partlcularly  subsldies  and  tax-based  wage  rules.
3.2  A  Simple  POIicy fen
In  much  of  the  existing  policy  game  literature  it  is  worth  noting  that
the  cholce  of  railing  output  above  the  natural  rate  can  generally  be
attributed  to  labour  market  rigiditles.  However,  in  the  transitlonal  economy,
no  player  knowe  whoro  the  natural  rate  lloe  --  there  is  a  learning  process
underway  --  and  a  cimple  mdodl  ln  whlch  inflation  and  output  enter  the  utllity
functlon  and  whoeo  tho  economic  causallty  and  tradeoffs  are  obvlous  has llttle
M  fcDonald  and  Solow  (1981).to  offor  gOg  Structural  change  and  the  niois  '  cooociatod  with  that  chango
obscure  conventLonal,  erging  colationshlps.  At  the  oam  tim,  political  and
institutional  complaxitie  make  mdeolling  mre@ dlgficult.
in  the  reforming  sconomy,  the  governmnt  otarts  neceoooArily  with  low
credibliLty 0 Agonts  not  only  are  uncertain  with  regard  to  the  charaeteristics
of  the  governrent  but  also  have  impergect  inoagmtion  regarding  exogenous
shocks  to  the  system.
4 ' If  credibility  io  a  stmet  variable  that  lo  time
dependent  the  larger  the  departure  frm  steady  state  values  at  the  outset,  the
larger  and  possibly  more  ;)rotracted  the  likely  demonstration  effect.  This  can
partially  explain  why  a  reforming  government  may  wish  to  super-correct  first
period  --  actually  prefer  output  losses  --  with  the  size  ag  that  correction
testifying  to  the  policy  maker's  adherence  to  announced  goals  4.
It is clear that  to  acquire credibilLty a  reforming  government of  the
Polish  variety has to  convince  agents that  it is in effect  a  wolf  but  not  in
sheep's  clothing. Zn particular,  the  government  seeks  to  imposo  a  hard  budget
constralnt  oan  producers  and  hence  will  not  resort  to  deficit  finance.  The
government  deals  wlth  organised  labour  via & trade  union  or worker-managers.1
It  seeks  to  shock  enterprise  managers  and  workers  into  behaving  like  true
profit-maximizers.  It  may  choose  to  use  toloranc6e  of  bankruptcy  me  an
instrument  for  demonstrating  its  resolve.  It will  correspondingly  accept  that
unemployment  is above  any  implicit  target  lovel. 4'  Agents  will  seek however
41  Such  am a  Barroa-Grdon  set-up  with  output  given  by  VV 04+(n-zO)  and  a
governmant  one period  function;  -($.0O)  - - °  a(y-y),  a"
-_  4  a(n-2 0)
4'  Note  that  if  the  policy  maker  has  no  superior  information  regarding
exogenous  shocks  then  a  rule-based  approach  could  merely  impart  greater
rigidity  to  the system.
4  See  Vickers (1986)  for  a  discusoson  of  separating  and pooling
equilibria  in a  two  period  model.
4I  The  union  and/or  worker-managers  could  also  be  seen  as  being  concerned
with  their  credibility  as  bargainers  on  the  part  of  workers;  especially  given
the  general  legacy  of  subservience  to  Party  and  State.
4' This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  government  accepZs  output  as
being  above  the target  level  as  it  may hold  that  thrgo  iL  ouch  oveE-manning  in
the  economy  that  productivity  gains  can  rapidly  swamp  employmnt looses.°  19  °
to  test the  governnt's  tolerance  of  out.ut  and employment  losses  ahd,
implieLtly,  its  abliLty  to  enforce  a  hard  budget  conestraint  on  fLrms.  Such
dlsecontLnuity  ln  p  eiference  could  be meon as  rocougre  to stabilisation  polley
and  would  hence  give rise  to  disecontinuty  in  tho  lndifflerence  curves  of the
unLion.  This  motivates  the  use of  oaboLdias  &s a  policy  or  stabilzation
lnotrument in  SGctlon  3.3  below.
This tensLon  ia  evident  once  a  glscal  polLcy  target  io  introduced.  That
target  encompasses  the  hard  budget  constraint  ln  so  far  as  subsidies  to  finrs
to  cover  operating  lossoe  directly  show  up  in  the  budget.  Moreover,  we  can
assum  that  unemployment  beLefit  io  paid  to  workers  and  iL  financed  through
the  budget.  Thus,  filcal  balance  depends  oa  enforclag  the  hard  budget
constraint  while  enforeLing  the  hard  budget  constraint  lmplies  lncreased
unemployment  and  hence  a  call  on  budgetary  resourcso  for  financing  the
unemployment system. Wm allude to  thli  tension  below.
3.3  a  osnle  Period  polLey  gam
We now motivate  a  simple  gam  in  non-cooperativo  and  cooperative
oettingo  over  tho  mLinmum  time  peilod  ln  which  a  pollcy  rule  can  be  appiled.
we present  solutlons  wlth  Nash  and  Stackelberg  equillbrla 0 We assume  a  closed
economy with  WCWs  and  a  government.  Indlvidual  workero  are  Ersk  neutral,
u(W)=VY.  Unlon  ebership  lo  constant  and  oet  equal  to  1.  No  taxes  are
levled.  The  WCF  maximlzse  the  utility  function  ln  eq. (3.9)  subject  to  the
zero  profit  constralnt  ln  eq. (3.10)  with  reopect  to  employment  and  wages.
Ut,  L  LK  4  B-  La  (3.9)
F(L)  - m.  +  8  - 0  (3.10)
The only  difference  from  the basic  model  of  Section  3.1  ia that
subsidles  (8)  now anter  the  zero  proflt  constraint.  Subeidles  are  posittvely
assoclated  with  employment  and/or  the  wage.
The goverment  has  the  following  siaple  utility  functlons
Us  SL  -PS,  PO  (3.11)- 20  -
The  parameter  p  represents  the  government'  trade-off  betweon  employment  and
paying  subsidies.  Z  A hlgh  P implies  that  the  government  im  strongly  averi s
to  departures  from  fiscal  balance.  We assum that  the  governmant  adept.  the
following  rule  for  the  payment  of  vubaLdles8
89 sF(L)v  *  P  0  (3.12)
The  goavernnt  is  assumed to  condltion  lts  policy  on  output  so  that  subsidies
are  paid  as a fraction of  fi  rs'  output.'"
At  this  stage,  unemployment  b.noflts,  3,  are  assumed  exogenous  and  the
total  payment  ,f  benefits  (1-L)B  does  not  enter  the  govorment'e  utliLty
funcetion  .
Finally,  we  use  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  decreasing
returns  to  scale.  We write  ?(L)  ast
F(L)  - AV,  where  Ai  tt  0,  and  0  < a  4 1  (3.13)
The  Mash  equilibrium
The  WCV  maLmLzes  Lts  utillty  taking  the  government's  choice  of  a  as
given. Consequently,  eq.  (3.9)  li  maximized  with  respect  to  W and  L subject
to  the  eq.  (3.10)  and  the  subsidy  rule  in  eq.  (3.12).  The  firm's  reaction
curve  Lo  s3
W  a  B/a  (3.14)
The  union',  choles  of  employment  as  a  functLin  of  the  subsidy  parameter  io
given  by  eq. (3-15),  where  an  increased  subsidy  parameter,  a,  will  always  be
associated  with  increased  employment.
L  ((1  +)Aa/BJ""  (3.15)
46  Only  positive  subsidies  are  considered.  Note  that  this  implies  the
fLocal  trade-off  alluded  to  above.
7 Relating  subsidies  to  employment,  the  wage-bill  or  an  amount
independent  of  W, L  or  F(L)  would  not  markedly  alter  the  results.
*  We  will  later  consider  what  happens  if  the  payment  of  unenployment
benefits  enter  the  governemt'S  utility  function.
Z  Calculations  are  avaLlable  from  the  authors.°  21  -
The  government  knows  the  zero  proflt  constraint  of  the  LC? but  ln  this
uetting  Can  only  lnfluonce  pLoymet,  taking  wage  s  given.' 0 The
government's  reaction  curve  is  hence  found  by  malmising its  utllity  in eq.
(3.12)  wlth  respect  to  a,  subject  to the  subsidy  rule  in  eq. (3.13)  and  the
zero  profit  constralnt  (eq.  (3.11)).  The  govornmnt  reacts  to  a gLven  W by
the choLe-  of  s  lmpleitly  glven  by  eq. (3.16)  belows
105
W  X  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(3.16)
In  (s,W)  space  the  government's  reactlon  curve  will  be  downward eloping  slnce
dW/ds  '  0.  The  governmnt's cholce  of  s as a functonL  of  th  employment  level
is implieLtly  glven  by  eq. (3.17)  below.
L-  [OA(1-a+s)  1J"4)  (3.17)
Ig  a/B  6  p s  1/(1-a)(a/8)  there  exlsts  a  unlque  Nash  equillbrlum  (with  s  a 0)
which  in  stable.  That  eWulibrium  iWliLes  a  subsidy  aameter  NB",  an
employment  level  L's,  and  a  wage  W  s
L  tF  - (Oa  I  (O)B)/(sB-)  *  a2 /(B)  o  (a)
WNE - B/a
a  >  0  implles  payment  of  positive  subsidles  to  the  firgm  a  soft  budget
constraint.5"  The  employment  ln  the  NE  (L;89) is greater  than  if  no  subsidies
are  pald  (4L),  vlz;  LNJ  a  L 0. The  wage is B/a since  the  unlon's  choLie  of  wage
does  not  depend  on  the  subsidy  parameter.  An  increase  in  0  lowers  both  8NW
and  LIe.  Emphasizing  flscal  balance  will  be  assocLated  with  lower  subsidLes
and  employment.
These  points  are graphlcally  presented  ln  Figure  3.2.
T  his is somewhat  ad hoc.  One  justlficatLon  could  be the government
conditloning  subsldy  polLcy  on  output,  hence  mployment.  In  the  later
Stackelber;  setting  with  government  as  leader,  wages  are  no  longer  taken  as
given.
0 fong  1  *  1/(l=&)(a/B).- 22  -
f  \  ~~~~~~~NE
,NB  a  sUnion's  reaetion  curve
Government's  reaction  curve




Tho  lnteruectlon  between  the  reactLon  curves  ln  the  upper  panel  is the
Nash  equLlibrLum. SubeLdLes  are  on  the horLzontal  and  wages  on  the  vertical
axis  . In  the lower  panel  the  curves  show  the  optlmal  relatLonshLp  between
employment  and  the subsidy  parameter  for,  respectLvely,  the union  (eq.  (3.15))
and  the  government  (eq. (3.17)).  The LntersectLon  between  these  curves
represents  the  subsLdy  parameter  and  employment  for  the Nash equilibrium. An
increase  of  i  will  lead  to a  horizontal  shLft  of  the  government's  reactLon
curve  to the left  (and  likewLie  for  the curve  for  eq. (3.17))  and  hence  lead
to  lower  employment.
The Stackelberg equilibriu, with  the government as the leader 
We now assum  that  the  government  sets  Lts  subeldy  parameter  before  the
WCP sets  the  wage  and  employment.  The  government  acts  as  a  Stackelberg  leader
maximizing  its  utllity  takLng  into  account  the fLrm's  reaction  to  Lts  polLcy
s0
if 1/8  e  S  /(l='a)(1/8)  subsLdy  parameter  5%,  employment  L  and
wages  W4 are  saLmlar  Ln  thLe  Stackelberg  equillbrLum  to  the solutLons  for  the
Nash  equlILbrLum.  ThLi  can  be  grasped  from  Flgure  3.2.  The Stackelborg
'2  Calculatlons  for  both  Stackelberg  settLngs  are  avaLlable  on  request
from  the  authors.- 23  -
equilibrium  is obtained  where  an indliference  curve  li tangent  to  the firmo
reaction  curve.  This polnt  can  be seen  to be where  tho  government's  and  the
firm's  reaction  curves  intergset.
The Stackelbeag  eqpuilbrium  with the  NCw as  mae  leader
In  this  case  the  WCF is assumed  to  mova first  taking  into  account  the
reactions og thin  government.  The firm maximises  its utility with  respect to  L
and  V subject  to the zero  profit  constraint  and  subject  to  the  subsidy  rule in
eq. (3012),  and  subject to the governmat's  reaction curve (eq. (3.16)  or  eq.
(3.17)).  IXf  1/B 1  < 6  (/(1°a)+1)  (1/B)  S  tackaberg euilibrium with s  a  0
exists and  is unique.  Denoting the subsidy parameter, the employment and  the
wage  for  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium  where  the  WCF  ls  the  leader  mu,  Lu,  and
WV we  haves
Son &,2/  (1!Bl)  - (l-a)
V1  C  PAa2,/  (  13-1)  4<
The  suboLdy  and  cmployment  prmeters  are  blggew  than for  the Hash
equlibbrium. ThiL  occurs  because  the firm  effectively  endgoenizes  the
government  policy  rule  and  hence  the  willingness  to  pay subsidles  conmdLtioned
on  output.  The  wage  V  lo  however  lower  than foe  the  Mash  equlilbrlum;  a
function  of the  downward  sloping  government  reaction  curve.  Hence  whles
subsidies  and  mployment increave,  the firm,  will  aloo  accept  a lower  wage.
3.4  con6udLu  coets
The aove  results  hold  for  non-cooperative  settLngs. A Nash bargaLning
solution  wlth  eqal  bargainlng  powers  delivers  subsidy  and  employment
parameters  hlgher  than  in any  of the  non-cooperatLve  settLngs.  Wages  are
found  to  Le  somewhere  between  the  Stackelberg  euillbgLrum  with  the  fLrm  as
leader  and  the  Nash  squillbrium.  U
The  very  simple  policy  game  presented  in  this  section  obvLously  suffers
from  not  explieLtly  enterLng  a  cost  term  dlrectly  lnto  the  goverment
n  Detailed  results  are  available  from  the  authogs.^  24  -
function.  A more  elaborate  treatment,  along  the  lines  pursued  by  DrLf  ill
(1985),  would  be to incorporate  a social  welfaxe  function  in  whiCh  a  cost
term,  associated  wlth  departures  from  fiscal  balance,  would  figure.  '5  A more
tractable  way of  proeentLng  the  problem  in  the  light  of  the  prosent  model
would  be  to  lncorporate  any  negative  utllity  attaching  to  the  government  from
payment  of  unmployment  beneflts.  This  is  obvlously  a  more  restrletLve
approach.  Wrltlag  unemploayment benefits  (l-L)3  the  goverment's  utility
function  now reads#
us  - L  - *(S*l-L)B),  * a  0  (3  18)
collecting  toe,  divLding  through  wlth  (pB+1)  and  defLinng  Us/(0B+1)  as  Us, s
us  - L  - 0/(0B+1)8  - 0B/(8+1)  (3.19)
We see  that  the  parameter  in  front  of  S  has  decreased  compared  to  the  utlilty
functLon  in  sq.(3.11).  The obvious  LntuLtLon  is  that  if  the  government  has  a
wLillngness  to  pay  unemployment  benefLts  this  will  be  associated  with  a  lower
weight  on  budget  balance  and  thLs  in  likely  to  imply  a higher  subsidy
parameter  It  does  not  of  course  capture  any  of  the  more  complex  offsetting
effects.
The  polley  game  developed  above  has  clear  limitations.  Nevertheless,  Lt
seeks  to  formallse  a  basic  dLiama  for  transitional  governmentag  the  trade-off
between  employmnt  and  subsidies,  where  subsidies  are  in  effect  continuation
of  the  soft  budget  constraLnt.  A cooperative  solution  can  be  shown  to  yield
relatLvely  low wages  but  hlgh  employment  and  hence  hlgh  subsidies.  Both  the
Nash  equilibrium  and  the  Stackelberg  setting  with  the  goverrment  as  leader,
will  delLver  hiLgher wages  than  the  cooperative  setting,  with  employment  and
subeLdiLes  lower.  When the  WCF is  the  Stackelberg  leader  it  prceLves  the
government  rule  and  endogenLzes  polLcy  when optimizLng.  In  effect  the  WCF
optlmize.  against  a  steeper  employment/subsidy  curve.  Higher  employment  and
subidies  result  wLth  a  lower  wage  than  for  the  Nash  Equlilbrlum  and
government  Stackelborgo  sttLngs.  Expressed  simply,  if  the  WCW  understands
U  For  example  a  *o,al  welfare  functions  Vs  -(L-L) 2 - aD 2 where  the  second
captures  the  costs  of  fiscal  imbalance.- 25
that  the  governmnt  cares  about  employment (dspiLto  possible  announcomnts  to
the  contrary)  this  wLil  result  ln  the  government  offering  subsLdLes  to  firms
and  hence  balling  them  out.  Such  subsLdles  permit  hlgher  than  warranted
employment.  It  La clear  --  but  here  lnadequately  devloped  that  the  fLscal
costs  can  be  non-trivlal.  By being  unable  to  mplemnAt  a  hard  budget
constraint  on  the  WCls the  credibility  of  the  reform  program  --  and  hence the
signaliLng  of  a  regim  break  --  would  be undermined.
Se otLos 4: 'ax  Rles  amd the Worker Controlled Vim
We have  already  alluded  to  the  widespread  use  of  tax-based  Lncome
polLeLs  ln  partLally  reformed  socialist  economies.  TheLr  use  can  be  traced
to  a  multipleicty  of  objectives.  These  Lncludeg  restraLAt  on  the
appropriation  of  labor  rontsj  regulation  of  firm  leel labor  demand  and
regulation  of  offectLve  demad,  To the  extent  that  the  market-based  economy
lacks  fully  endogenized restraints  on  pricing  and  ownership  remaLns  largely
socialized,  tax-baed  incmes policies  retain  relevance,  as recent  Pollsh
experience  testLfies.
In  this  section  we provide  a  very  sumary  treatment  of  tax  rules  and
indicate  the  lLkely  dLfferLng  outcome  wlth  respect  to  employment and  wages.
We work  with  the  model  discussed  in  sectLon  3.  For  simplicity,  we  assume
individual  workers  are  riLk  neutral.  The  tax  enters  dLrectly  into  the  zero
profit  constraLnts
F(L)  - IlL - T  - 0  (4.1)
We consLder  the  followLng  four  tax  rules  us
(i)  Wage-bill  tax,  where  the  tax  is  levLed  on  that  share  of  the  wage  bill  (WI)
above  a  preannounced  norm.  0  represents  the  norm  so  that;  T  - t(WL  - A1,
when WL  Z A a  0.  ThLi  type  of  tax  was  widely  used  Ln the  PRE setting  and  in
Poland  ln  1990  (see  Section  2),
(iL)  Wage  per  worker  tax,  where  wages  in  excess  of  a  norm  (s)  are  taxed  so
that:  T a tLW  - w,  when  W  a  a a 0,
'i  More complicated  rules  s  such as  those  Lncorprating  value-added  or
productivLty  - are  Lgnored.- 26 
(ILl)  Production  taxg T a  t(F(L)  y],  when F(L)  a  y  a  0  and  where  y  is  the
norm  or  threshold  level,
(Lv)  A lump  sun  tax,  equal  to  a  contantg  T  *  t.
In  Table  4.1  we  derive  the  multlpliors  from  the  VCF'  maximization
subject to  the  toro  profit constraint and the particular tax rule. "  Note
that  the  tax  parameter.  are  taken  as  exogenous by  the  WCP  ln  this  arrangment.
We  distinguish  between  the  tax  rule  itself  and  a  prameter  for  the  tax  norm  or
threshold.  The  multLpliers  in  brackets  are  for  specific  functional  form  for
the  production  function,  namely  a  semi-Cobb-Douglas  "I  those  outslid  of
brackets  relate  to  a  generic  production  function  with  decreasing  returns  to
scale.  2
Several  results  stand  out.  A  wage  bill  tax  and  a  productlon  tax  have
exactly  similar  effects  and  clearly  result  in lowr  employment  and  a  likely
increase  of  wages.  This  equivalence  is  useful  to  illustrato  the  negative
supply-sAe  implications  of  the  wage-blll  tax.  Thli  tax  rule  effectively
motivates  firms  to  shed  laborl  not  necessarily  a  desirable  component  for  a
market-base  reform  economy.  Change  ia  the  taxable  norm  (a  and  y)  proves
neutral  vie-a-vim  employment  but  wages  unambiguously  increase  with  an  increase
in  2  or  y.
For  the  tax  per  worker,  by  contrast,  an  increase  in  the  tax  rate  clearly
lowers  wages  and  raises  employment.  An  increase  in  the  norm  (s)  leads  to
higher  employment  but  the  impact  on  wages  is  ambiguous.  This  tax  rule  clearly
has  an  emplayment  bias  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  wage  bill.  It  can  be  noted
that  so  long  as  the  wage  coiling  is  above  the  resorvation  wage  or  unemployment
benefit,  an  increase  ln  the  ceiling  will  stimulate  employment  and  reduce
wages.
"  Detailed  calculations  available  from  the  authors.
5  viz;  F(L)  - ALI,  whore  A >  0,  and  0  <  a  <  1.
F(0)  a0,  ' (L)  D1  0,  FR (L)  <  0.27 
Finally,  a lump  sum  tax  merely  lowers  the  wage  and is neutral  for
employment. Note that  a lump-sum  tag  is equLvalent  tO  a fixed  cost,  whlch  has
been  widely  studied  in  the  literature  oa  labor  mnaged figmo.  It  is  ales  a
negative  subsidy,  and  can  thus  be interpreted  in  conection wlth  the reduction
of  subsidles  whlch  accompanies  the  shLft  to  a  market-based  systam.  Our  model
LndLicates  that  an  increase  in  any  type  of  fized  costs#  such  as  the  reduction
of  subsidies  that  is  a  feature  of  the  shift  to  a  market-based  system,  will
lower  wages  without  affecting  employment.
T_able  4,1:  NE  feat  of  tag  riles  on Aaes*  'd eMfilovue
Effect  of  lnerease  Effect  of  increase
of  parameter  t  on  in  norm,  ons
employ..  wages  employm.  wages
Wage-blll  tax  C-)  7  (+)  0  (0)  4  (+)
Wage  per  worker  7  (7)  7  (7)  +  )  7  (\
ProductLon)  ax  7  ()  0  (0)  4)
Lump sum  tax  0  (0)  . -na  na
Section  5  OwoenashL Reor.  and  Decapita1Lsatiom
There  Ls a  well  reheagsed  sot  of  arguments  as  to  why socialized  flrms
tend  to  be  subject  to  decapitalLzation.  These  ran  as  follows.  Workers  can
only  enjoy  the  banefits  of  capital  Lf  they  work  in  the enterprises  where  that
capital  Le employed. An absent  capital  market  dilutes  the  longer-term
Lnterest  of  workers  in  the  firm. Both  features  wL1  tend  to  favour  an
appropriation  of  those  benefits  into  current  earnings.  Wage  pressure  ln  the
system  w1il  conequently  be  severe,  subject  only  to  the  effectiveness  of
external  restraints,  such  as  tax  policy  and  rules  regarding  reLnvestment.  s
Thoso  rules  w1il  tend  not  to  bind  Ln more  decentralzsed  settlngs.
H  Hinds  (1990)  forcefully  presents  this  line  of  argument.2  25
While  this  stylization  is  extreme  and  the  degre to  which  mrket-basoed
restraints  are  endogeniled  in  the  fiLm  will  depend  on a wide  range  of
factors  '0,  it  ls  obvious  that  introducing  uncertainty  over  ownegrshlp,  through
an  announced  strategy  of  prLvatisation,  could  pooibly  accelerate  capital
depletLon  ln  the  transition.  If  fILrm  are  worker  controlled  and  a  coertaLn
proportion  could  expect  to  be  prLvatised  next  period  I  hance  losing  access
to  capital  given  by  the  prior  ownership  tor,  this  might  motivate  consumption
of  capLtal  ln  the  current  priLod.  By  contrast,  capital  depletion  this  period
would  have  negative  implications  for a firm  that  remained  worker  controlled
next  period.  Fraom  sciety's poLnt  of vLew,  a lower  capital  stock  next  perLod
can  valLdate  a lower  level  of employments  hence  a  possible  source  of
hysteresis. The  policy  objective  is then to  reuoncile  the  desire  for
ownershlp  refom  (and  the  knowledge  that  thle  cannot  be done overnlght)  with
meaoures  to  restrict  loweriAg  the capltal  stock as  a  function of the
uncertainty  m  td  by  prospective owerhilp  reform.  We examine thli  locue
in  relation  to  use  of  tax  polLey  and  also  the  poseLble  use  og  vouchers  ae  a
means  of  restrlctLng  decapLtaLzation.  The  overall  problem  can  be  couched
acceesibly  in  terms  of  an  intert  ral  Lmamsiation,  buLldLng  upon  the  boasic
model  developed  in Section 3.1.
501  A two  period  modl with  the  worker  eontrlled  gfism
We  extend  our  basic  model  for  the  WCF  (Section  3.1)  in  a  two  period  case
using  a  productLon  functlon  with  labour  and  capital  as  arguments.  Risk
noutrality  for  LndiLvidual  workers  is  assu*  In  period  1  the  fim iL  a  WCF,
while  ownership  in  period  2  is  uncertaLn.  We  assuma  that  the  fLrm continues
as  a  WCF  with  the  probabilty,  q,  whlle  being  privatized  has  the  probability,
(l-q).e  Throughout  lower  case  subserLits  donote  the peri-od,  L  1,2.
'0  See  Blinder,  et  al (1990)1  Prasnikar,  at  aI (1990).
a  PrivatisatLon  could  take  the  form  of  divostituroe  or  imple  closure.
a  More  precisely,  q  is  the  unionle  point  estLmate  of  the  firm  being  a  WCP
in  period  2.- 29  -
5.2  2he  fia  in  worker  controlled
If  the  firm  la  worker  controlled  the  unlua'  utlilty  functLon  is  as  follows;
U?'*  -L,IWI 4  B9  LAB,  (5. 1)
The  production  functian  Le  similua  in  both  periods  and  includes  capital
(K,)  as  well  as  labour.  We also  include  an exogenous  productLvity  shock  (O1  >
9,(L.,,K,),  i  *  1,2
We assume  posLtLve  but  decreasing  marginal  returns.  Fo,  simplicity  we  assue
no  depreciation  of  capital. The firm  can sell (and  buy)  capital  at  the start
of each period  at  the  prLce  p,  i  a 1,2  and  the  VCF has  to  dcide  at  the start
of  each  period  how  much capital  to  sell (or  buy)  and  how  much  to  allocate  to
productLon.  The WCF  pays  taxes  to  the government  amounting  to T,,  . - 1,2.
The  WCF has inLtlally  at period  1  a  capital  stock  R.  It  decLdes  to  use
K,  for  production  and  sells  th  rest,  worth pl(K-K,)o  The zero  profLt
constraint  for  period  1 can  now  be  expressed  ass
9  j,  ,R,)  - ;L,W 1 4  p,(K-K,I)  - T,  - 0  (5.2)
The zero  profit  constraLnt  for  period  2  when  the firm  is still  worker
controlled  ios
62F(L2 1,2)  - L2 r 2 +4 P2(K,-)  - T'  - 0  (5.3)
From  expressions  (5.2)  and  (5.3)  it can  be  seen  that  the  WCF cannot  lend  to,
or  borrow  from,  sources  outside  the fiLrm.
Flnally,  we  specify  the  tax rule as a  wage  per  worker  tax (see  SectLon
4).
T,  - t;jq{"lj@f),  i  - 1,2  (5.4)
5.3  The fire  is  privatised
If  the fLrm  is  prLvatLeOd  new  owners  take over  ln  period  2  and there  is
a  regime  change.  We assume  that  the decLiLons  taken  by  the  workers  ln  period
1  do  not  influence  the utilLty  of  the  union  in  period  2 if the firm  is
privatLzed.  Further,  if  the firm  is privatized  it  is not  taxed.  In  the  event
of  the  fLrm  being privatized  in  period  2  the exogenous  utLilty  level  obtained
is  U2*-- 30  -
5.4  The  wCFs  problem
The  WCV  mximizes  its  expected  utility  with  respect  to  the  instruments
L,,  R,,  L,  K 2 discounting  the  utility  in  period  2  with  the  discount  factor  6,  0
<  6  s  1.
max  {  U,'c  +  (lq)U 2 m  +  qU2W>C)  }
LlIJCIJA
The  utillty  levels  U,VwL,  i - 1,2  are found  by  inserting  the  tax  rules  eq.
(5.4)  into  the  zero  profit  constraints  (eq.  (5.2)  and  eq. (5.3)),  isolating
W,Lq  and  inserting  these into  the  utility  functions  eq. (5.1).
The  first  order  conditions  with  respect  to  LI  and  Xi  ares
1
(e,Fu(L,,K,)  + t,i,l  B-  0  (5.5)
1+tl
1  1
- 1O,FK,(L,,K,)  pi]  +  -6SP  - 0  (5.6)
l+t,  1+t2
The  interpretation  of eq. (5.5)  is  that  the  union  chooses  an  employment  level
and  that  amount  of  capital  whereby  the  maginal utillty  of  one  extra  employee
equals  Bt,  (the  marginal  utility  of being  unemployed).  Eq. (5.6)  says  that  LI
and  K,  are  chosen  so that  the  marginal  utiLity  from  keepLng  one more  unit  of
capital  (increased  production  and  value  of  males  next period)  equals  the
utility  of  selling  that  unit  of  capital  this period.
5.5  some  Results
we  analyze  how  the  exogenous  variables  influence  the  amount  of  capital
kept in  production  in the firot  period,  L,  and  XI, where  the bigger  K,,  the
lower  the  extent  of dcapitalization.  LI  and  RI are determined  jointly  by  eq.
(5.5)  and  eq. (5.6).  Calculation  of  the  multipliers  yields  the  following
results  g9
dK,  /dq  >  0  dKI,  /dS  2  0  t  dK, /dp,  <  0  F  dKI  /dpl  0p
dKj/dO,  1 0  dKI/d2  a  0
a3 Detailed  calculations  are  available  from  the authors.- 31  -
As  es  te,  the  higher  the  probability  of the firm  remaining  worker
controlled  (q)  ln period  2,  the  lower  the  extent  of  docapitalization.
Likewise,  gsrater  diocounting  (6)  by  the  WCW and  a higher  price  of  capltal  in
period  2  give  pooitive  multipliers.  So  does  a  positLve  productlvity  shock  (Os)
through  the  higher  value  of  capital  stock  in  perLod  1.  A productivlty  shock  in
period  2  ie  neutral.  By  contrast,  if  the  price  of  capital  in  period  1  li  high
thLs  reverses  the  sign,  LndLeatLng  that  the  WC?F  will  sell  capital  in  period  1
and  honce  decapitalize  the firm.
5.6 Tax poUchw
We now  consideg  how  a  tax  rule  can  be  Lmplemented  so  as  to  limit  any
incipLent  decapitalisatLon.  We Lsnert  a  wage  per  worker  tax  where  taxation
fallo  on wages  above  a  certain  norm;  W, :e,. DLstLnguLshing,  as  in  Section  4,
between  the  t  parmeter  (t)  and  the  tax  norm  or  threshold  (e),  the  following
multLpliero  can  bo derLvod;
dKl/dt,  '  0  J  if  sI  >  B,
dR2/dt 2 6  0  d1/do, 2  0  dK3Jdo 2 - 0
Uoing  thls tan  rule it emerges  that a  sufggLLently  hlgh tax  parameter
can  arrest  docapitalizatLon  Ln peLrod  1  but that a  hlgher  tax rate  ln  period  2
will promote  decapitalisatLon.  This is a  result  of a  substitution  effect
making it  mEOo favorable to  be paid  wages in pyeiod  1 than in period  2.  Note
also that a uniform tan increase for the two perLods  (dt,  a  dt 2) will redue
decapLtalLsation,  dKI/dt,  4  dR,/dt 2 >  O  if  et  a'  B,.
An  Lncroaoo  of the  wage  norm Ln  perLod  1  (et)  Lncreases  retaLned  capital
whlle  an  Lnrease  in  o2  leaves  RI  unchanged.  The  reason  for  dKR/dwj being
pooLtLve  is  that  the  marginal  utliLty  of  labour  has  increased.  Thls  implies
hLgher  employment  and also a  larger  capLtal  stock.
This section  makes  clear  that using  an appropriate  tax  rule  --  ln  this
case a  wage per worker  rule  --  capital  depletion  can  be restrained. However,
thLs requLres  a somewhat  dLfferentLated  tax stance  across  the two  perLods. An
expected  hlgh tan  parameter  Ln  period  2  will  certainly  promote  capltal
depletion. The polLcy  challenge  is to apply  a  hlgh  tax parametor  and  wage32  -
norm  in  period  1  relative  to  those  applied  in  prilod  2. Clearly,  the  WVF  wlll
retaln  capital  lnto  period  2  only  lf  it  believes  that  it  will  nat  be  subject
to  higher  taxation  that  period.
5e7  Vouchers
PursuLng  the  line  of  argument  developed  above,  we  now consLder  whether
introducing  a  contingent  claim  On a  specified  share  of  the  value  of  capital  of
the  WCF  could  liduce  modilied  behaviour  by  the  1Cr  glven  uncertainty  ovor
ownershlp  next perlod.  We consider  in partiLular  the case  of a  voucher  handed
out  to  members  of  the  weV.  The  value  of  the  voucher,  V,  lie
V - apR  if  firm  privatized,  0  if  firm  still  workor  controlled.
a  is  a constant  (a  a  0)  expressing  the  fractlon  of  the  value  of  the  capital
represented  by  the  voucher.
The  utility  of  the  unlon  ln  the  caoe  where  the  firm  is  privatized  can
consequently  be  exproseed  am the  following  sumI
U21-o  - 12+  apAK 1,
where  U 2m  is  the  exogenous  utility  obtained  in  the  abosnes  of  a  voucher.
Assuming  that  the firm  pays no  taxes lf  it  ia privatized,  the  ma&xLmiation
problem  of  the  ICF  can  now be  written  ass
Max  {  U,1' +  6((1-q)U2Pf+V  +  qu 2 ) )
LIXI.L=KJ
The  first  order  conditlons  now contain  a  term  for  the  value  of  the  voucher:
1
--  (O 1 Vu(L,,K,) t  tol)  - 0S  0  (5O7)
l+t1
1  1
- SFx,l(LI,K1)  pi)  +  S(1-q)apa+  - 8qh *  0  (S.8)
1  +t 1 1+ta
From eq.  (5.8)  (the  flrst  order  condltlon  with  respect  to  X,)  it  can be  seen
that  a  voucher  introduces  an  additlonal  term  wlth  posiLtve  expected  utility
from  retalning  more  capital  in  period  1.
Inserting  the  voucher  results  in  dX1/dq  having  an  lndeterminate  sign.
This  comes  about  because  although  an  expected  galn  for  tho  WCF  will  result
from  beLng  able  to  sell  capLtal  in  period  2,  this  will  be  offset  by  an33
expected  los  from  not  being  able  to  each  the  vouchor.0  However,  dK 1/da > 0,
ue that  if  the  value  of  the  voucher  Lo  increased  iore  capital  will  bo  rotained
in  the  firm.  l
§08  Co"elUdLa  cseoats
in  this  sectlon  we havo  eplaored  an  prtant losu  for  the  reforming
econamyu  can  uncertainty  or  ownership  an  oit  incentivevS  for
decapitalisatlon  be  mitlgated  by  applying  an appropriate  tan  rule  and/or
offering  a  contingent  claim  on  capital  to  _  a69  of  the  WCF  ?  Given  the
announcemnt  of impending  privatisation  by  refo  governments,  a  two  perLod
setting  ose  quite approprLate.  The model has  som  obvious  disadvantages.
There  is  no  e  ctation  to  price  and  the  only  unesrtainty  is  with  respect  to
privatisation.  Equally,  we ignore  any  of  the  likely  wealth  effects  --  and
conequpent  macroeonemic  implications  --  let  alone the  transactions  costo  and
the  design  issues  assoclated  wlth  a  voucher  schemh.  Nevertheleso,  lt  is
evident  that  a  suitable  tax  rule  a  tax  yer worker  --  can  d  nU@n  tendenciae
to  capital  depletion.  This  io  an  important  point  to  the  extent  that  it
adjoins  to  the  conclusions  from  Section  4 whOgo the  wage  par  worker  rule  can
lead  to  lower  wages  and  higher  employment.
Section  ;  Conclusion
We have  attepted  in  this  paper  to  draw  out  the  implications  of  the
ownership  structure  and,  subsequently 9 uncertainty  over  that  structure,  for
wage  and employment setting in refoming  socialiet econoamies.  We have
indicated  the  atrong  tendencies  to  oxceesive  employment  and  wage  drift  in
these  system,s  in  part  consequent  upon  the  ownership  structure  and  the
associated  legacy  of  earlier  regimes.  Our primary  focus  has  been  on  the
if  a-l/(l+t,),  the  multiplier  dK,/dq  - 0,  and  the  firm  is  indifferent
over  privatization  or  continuation  as  a  WCW.
6  if  the  value  of  the  voucher  equated  the  value  of  capital  in  the  fim,
then  of  course  decapitaLization  in  this  setting  would  be  rendered  indepandent
of  the  probability  oif  privatisation.- 34
market-b0aed  econmy, ams :xsmplifiod  by  Poland  since  1990.  Surveying  recent
developments  in  Poland 9 although  open  unzploymnet  has  emerged  to  a
significant  degree,  it  is  otriking  to  note  the  continuing  resistance  to
downward pressure  on wages.
In  the  light  of  theas  stylized  featuroso  we then  set  up  a  series  of
models  which  focus  on  the  behavior  of  tho  worker  controlled  firm. We develop
a  simple  policy  gam  where  govoerxuwt  policy  is  conditioned  on  output  through
a  subsidy  instrumnt.  This  reflects  the  characteristic  problem  faced  by
reforming  governments  of  whether  to  oeforce  a  hard  budget  constraint  and hence
tolerate  higher  unemployment  or  vhether  to  rosort  to  subsidies  and associated
departures  from  fiscal  targets.  We locate 9 in  both  cooperative  and  non-
cooperative  settings,  the Implications  for  wages,  employment  and subsidies.
Given  the  cositment  to  privatisation  end  the  consequent  uncert_inty
over future  claims on  capital, we  aloo  develop  in a two period model the
conditions  under  which  the  WCF  will  deplete  its  capital  stock,  possibly
through  excessive wage  growth. We indicate  how an appropriate tax rule  °-  in
thlo  case a  wage  per  worker rule  °  can  restrain  decapitalization.  We also
touch  lightly  on  the  posBible  utility  of  contingent  claims  on  capital,  such  as
vouchers,  in  offsetting  capital  depletion  promoted  by  uncertainty  over
property  rights.
Finally,  we emphasize  the  way  in  which  vage  tax  rules  can  affect
employment  and  wages  and  how  critical  is  their  design.  A wage  bill  tax,  as
used  in  Poland  through  1990,  not  only  lowers  employment  but  will  likely  raise
wages.  By contrast,  a  wage  per  worker  tax  will  tend  to  raise  employment  and
lower  wage..  These  effects  are  likely  to  be  reinforced  in  a two-sector
context  where  the  WCF  oector  and  privete  firm coexist  and  where  relative  wage35 
ceneideations  alre  importante - The  reolvant  vage  for  private  sector  workers
might  be  the  relative  wage with  respect  to  the  WCF  sector.  As  a  consequence
tho  wge  set  by  the  WCF  will  have  direct  iWlications  for  wages  in  the  private
sector.  This  geinforces  the  point  that  wage  restraint  In  the  WCF  ts  likely  to
be  critical.  We  therefore  conclude  that  because  of  the  inherited  ownership
structure  and  the  uncertainty  asociated  vith  reform 0 merket-based  regimes
vill  continue  to  require  centralized  control.  over  vgegs  in  the  WCF  or
sociaized  sector.  Unemployment  and  an  expanding  private  sector  alone  is
unlikely  to  provide  a  sufficient  restraining  mechanism  for  wages.
We  intend  later  to  develop  a two  sector  model  lneorporating  officiency
wage  setting  in  the  private  sctor.36
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